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1Summary
It has been a long job trying to unify the rules of cross-border insolvencies within
the European Union. In the 1960´s the work started and as time went by and the
Union grew larger it became necessary to modify the high ambitions of unification,
set up from the beginning. Legislation about insolvency with cross-border effects
is necessary as a safeguard for an internal market. The preparations, which have
been extended over 40 years, ended up with the adoption of an EC Regulation,
coming into force on 31 May, 20021. By this Regulation a European judgment
regarding insolvency in a main proceeding will encompass assets in the whole
Union (with the exception of Denmark) and will automatically be recognised and
enforceable in other Member States. Although the creditors will still have the
possibility to protect assets within their respective countries by applying for a
territorial proceeding, despite the main proceeding going on. The territorial
proceeding will then operate as a secondary proceeding side-by-side with, but
still subject to, the main proceeding.
The provisions set up for jurisdiction are introducing a new concept – the
centre of a debtor´s main interests – as the place to apply for a main proceeding.
Regarding legal persons, this place is presumed to be located where the
registered office is, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The meaning of the
new concept will therefore be highlighted only if a company´s main interests are
elsewhere than the registered office. Since it is a new concept, not used in EU
Law before, one interesting question is of course how the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) will interpret it. Since the concept is a compromise between the
state of incorporation theory and the “real seat” theory, existing in national
law of the Member States, my main question is whether the interpretation will be
made uniformly or by reference to national law. There is no definition of the
concept in the Regulation, but the preamble to the Regulation contains some
guidance, why a subquestion is whether this preamble will be used by the ECJ in
interpretation or not.
Unusually enough, there is an Explanatory Report2 drawn up as guidance
to the content of the Regulation. The Explanatory Report was originally written in
relation to the 1995 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings3, which preceded the
Regulation and never came into force. The Explanatory Report is by the Swedish
delegate in the ad hoc Committe of the Convention, held to be important as a
source of law, even if it was not published and has no official status. A second
                                                
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ 2000
L 160/1. Hereinafter called the Regulation.
2 Explanatory Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (Authors: Virgos,
Miguel, Spain and Schmidt, Etienne, Luxembourg). Council´s document 6500/1/96, dated 8
July 1996, hereinafter called the Explanatory Report or the Report.
3 The Convention on insolvency proceedings of the 23 November 1995, hereinafter called
the Convention.
2subquestion is therefore whether the Explanatory Report will be used while
interpreting this new concept or not.
The Regulation contains another key concept, namely “establishment”. An
establishment in a Member State is a pre-condition for jurisdiction concerning a
territorial/secondary proceeding. In contrast to the other concept this one is well
known in EU Law. I have looked at how it relates to “the right of establishment”
within the meaning of the EC Treaty, Articles 43 and 48 and within the provisions
of special jurisdiction in Brussels I,
Article 5.5.
Besides preparatory documents and legislative acts I have studied literature
and articles in the field. The materials used are in some cases commentaries to the
Convention, but they are still valid in relation to the Regulation since there are no
real substantial differences between the Convention and the Regulation. The
Regulation is applicable to both natural and legal persons, but this work is
concentrated on legal persons.
The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters – also known as ”the Brussels Convention”4 – has
recently been replaced by a Regulation with some substantive amendments. In this
work I refer to it as Brussels I or the Brussels Convention, to be separated from
Brussels II5.
I have come to the conclusion that the ECJ will apply a uniform
interpretation of “centre of main interests” in order to make the Regulation
effective, obtain unified rules of jurisdiction and avoid “forum shopping”.
Nevertheless, the ECJ will probably draw inspiration from national law of the
Member States while giving the uniform interpretation. The preamble will
probably be of help in interpreting the concept, but it is leaving a large scope of
interpretation, why it will not be decisive. The Explanatory Report will probably
not play a major role either, while interpreting this concept, since it is more
restrictive than the preamble and enough guidance will be found in national law.
Regarding “establishment” I think the intended interpretation is closer to
the concept in Brussels I than in the Treaty, even if it is clear that the Brussels I
concept was not intended to apply to the Regulation concept. The definition in the
Regulation is wide and leaves a large scope of interpretation for the ECJ. Still, as
an exception to a main rule – just like in Brussels I – it is possible that the
interpretation will be held rather narrow.
                                                
4 The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, concluded on 27 September 1968, for a consolidated text, see OJ 1998 C
27/1.
5 Brussels I: Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001 L
12/1, entered into force on 1 March 2002. Brussels II: Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000
of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and
in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Joint Children, OJ 2000 L 160/19, entered into force
on 1 March 2001.
31 Introduction
I find the concept “centre of main interests” interesting, since it is a new concept
and a key element in the Regulation. It determines applicability of the Regulation -
it is only applicable if the centre is situated within the Community (see 4.1 The
Objective and Scope). It is decisive for jurisdiction regarding main proceedings
(see 5 The Centre of Main Interessts) and decisive concerning the main rule of the
proceedings (see 4.4 Lex Concursus). It is also decisive for determining where a
claim is situated. According to Article 2.g of the Regulation, claims shall be
regarded as situated in the Member State within the territory of which the third
party required to meet them has the centre of his main interests, as determined in
Article 3.1 of the Regulation. Apparently, it is important to know how the concept
will be interpreted.
The other key element in the Regulation is “establishment”. An
establishment in a Member State makes it possible to open up a
territorial/secondary proceeding (see 6 Establishment). The meaning of
“establishment” within the Regulation is therefore useful for the creditors to know.
In contrast to “centre of main interests”, “establishment” is known and used in EU
Law. The meaning of it within the Treaty is held to be very broad (see 6
Establishment). The meaning of it within Brussels I is considered to be very
narrow (see 6 Establishment). Since there is a definition of the concept in the
Regulation (Article 2.h), which is not the case for “centre of main interests”, one
could believe that there is very little scope of interpretation. I will make an attempt
to estimate where “establishment” within the Regulation will be put in relation to
the Treaty concept and the Brussels I concept.
42 Background
Insolvency law has for a long time been discussed as an area in need of
international legislation. It is a complex area involving many parties - the debtor,
creditors, employees - and interests - not only legal, but also economical and
social. Flessner puts it this way: “Insolvency proceedings typically involve, by their
all-encompassing nature, a large range of parties as well as complex debtor-
creditor relationships in a crisis situation where decisions with important economic
consequences have to be made swiftly”6. Virgos explains the necessity of a
common legal framework in this area of law with the facts that insolvency is not an
area where private initiatives can compensate for the lack of legislation, because
there is a risk for destructive competition for the debtor´s assets among the
creditors, acting in self-interest7.
2.1 Insolvency Principles
There are different normative principles governing insolvencies in
different jurisdictions, which explains why basic rules applicable to insolvencies
can differ fundamentally from one member state to another. You could even talk
about different “insolvency cultures”. Wood describes a pro-creditor jurisdiction
as allowing a creditor to protect himself against an insolvency, e. g. by security or
set-off and a pro-debtor jurisdiction aiming to maximise the defaulter´s assets so
as to increase the assets available for distribution. The pro-creditor argument is
that people should be able to avoid losses resulting from a debtor default. The
pro-debtor argument is that defaulters (and their employees) ought to be saved
and that all creditors ought to contribute to this rescue8. He ranks England,
Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden as more pro-creditor
jurisdictions than Denmark, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg
and France, which are considered as more pro-debtor9.
Generally it is every state´s choice how to cooperate with other
jurisdictions in private international law matters. Historically the EU Member
States have based their international laws regarding insolvency on two different
models – the universal and the territorial. The universal model demands a single
insolvency procedure comprising all the assets of the debtor, including those
located in other countries. It presupposes the mutual recognition of the effects of
insolvency procceedings. It is an internationally-oriented model. The territorial
model demands a local insolvency procedure for the assets of the debtor located
                                                
6 Flessner, A, “German International Insolvency Law and its Relation to the EC Convention
on Insolvency Proceedings”. European Business Law Review, 1999, vol 10, no 1-2, p 2.
7 Virgos, Miquel, The 1995 European Community Convention on Insolvency Proceedings:
an Insider´s View, The Hague, Boston, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p 1.
8 Wood, Philip R, Principles of International Insolvency, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995, p
3.
9 Wood, p 4-5.
5within the country, with effects limited to that territory. Parallell proceedings can
be going on in different states at the same time. It is a protective, nationally-
oriented model10. There can be features of protective measures in the universal
model as well as elements of cooperation in the territorial model.
Since cross-border insolvencies involve many aspects it has been difficult to
reach consensus on the principles that must govern them. Along with accessions
of  new member states to the European Union the work has not been easier.
2.2  The Convention
A committee of experts on bankruptcy was set up in 196011. They were
convened by the European Commission and were drawn from the original six
Member States12. Insolvencies had been excluded from the ongoing work with
the Brussels Convention on the Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (signed in1968) with the intention of being
regulated separately. The committee submitted a proposal in 1970, which was
renegotiated 1973, following the accession of the first three additional Member
States. The definitive version of this draft was sent to the Council in 1980 and
published in 1982 as “Bankruptcy, compositions and similar procedures”. The
work was suspended in 198513.
From 1980, in the Council of Europe, there were also negotiations going on
in this field, which resulted in the adoption of the European Convention on certain
international aspects of bankruptcy in 1990, also known as “the Istanbul
Convention”14. The Convention will enter into force after a minimum of three
ratifications have been lodged. It has been signed by eight states and ratified by
one, so it has not yet entered into force. The states which have signed the
Convention are Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg
and Turkey. Cyprus has ratified it15. Although the Istanbul Convention had the
effect of reviving work [regarding cross-border insolvencies] at the Community
level16.
In May, 1989 an informal meeting of EU Justice Ministers in San Sebastian
                                                
10 Virgos, p 2.
11 Surzur, Anne, Convention on insolvency proceedings. The result of thirty five years of
negotiation: principal provisions of the new draft, Europe Information Service (EIS), 1995,
p 1.
12 Fletcher, Ian F, Insolvency in Private International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, p
247.
13 Surzur, p 1 and 11, inter alia quoting Draft Convention and report in the European
Community Bulletin, supplement 2/82.
14 The European Convention on certain international aspects of bankruptcy, Council of
Europe, opened for signature on 5 June 1990 in Istanbul.
15 Current status at the Council´s of Europe homepage http://conventions.coe.int on 22 May
2002.
16 Surzur, p 2.
6reopened the question. In 1990 COREPER17 granted an ad hoc Committee a
mandate to draw up a new draft, appointing the German expert Manfred Balz as
its permanent Chairman18. The Committee presented a draft Convention, which
was preliminarily signed by every member state in September, 1995. It was
formally opened for assignment in November, 1995 and Great Britain was the
only member state that didn´t sign it before expiration of the assignment period in
May, 1996. This was because of the restrictions of trade due to ”mad cow”
disease19. The Convention was made available in all official EU-languages, all
equal without priority for any version20. It is a good idea to compare different
versions though, since at least the Swedish version – according to Mellqvist –
may contain linguistic errors, or ”flaws” as he calls it21.
In this context it might be of interest to mention the UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, adopted in 199722. It serves as a model for
legislation when a debtor has assets in more than one state. It is drafted so as to
enable each enacting State to insert into the text of the enacted Article such
specific references as are necessary to enable the provision to function as an
integral part of the insolvency law of that State23. According to Fletcher the fact
that it is open to a State to enact as much, or as little of the Model Law as it
pleases is likely to be viewed by some as an Achilles´heel24. The UNCITRAL
Model Law has been adopted in Eritrea, Mexico, South Africa and within
Yugoslavia, Montenegro25.
2.3 The Regulation
After expiration of the assignment period of the Convention the work entered into
a deadlock. At the same time cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs had been
transferred from the third to the first pillar by the Treaty of Amsterdam26. This
transfer meant that supranational legislation – such as directives and regulations –
should be used instead of conventions. During a transitional period of five years
from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council can only act
unanimously on a proposal from the Commisson or on the initiative of a Member
                                                
17 Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member States to the Institutions of the
European Union.
18 Surzur, p 2 and 37.
19 Mellqvist, Mikael, “Gränsöverskridande konkurshantering, EU:s konvention om
insolvensförfaranden”. Ny Juridik, 1996, nr 4, p 9.
20 Mellqvist, Ny Juridik 4:96, p 17.
21 Mellqvist, Ny Juridik 4:96, p 17.
22 The Draft Model Legislative Provisions on Cross-Border Insolvency, adopted on 30 May
1997 by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, hereinafter called the
UNCITRAL Model Law.
23 Fletcher, 1999, p 330.
24 Fletcher, 1999, p 361.
25 Current status at the United Nations homepage, http://www.uncitral.org. on 30 April 2002.
26 The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999.
7State after consulting the Parliament27. At the initiative of Germany and Finland,
the Commission
submitted, in May, 1999, a Draft Regulation to the Council28. After the
consultation procedure the Council adopted the Regulation on 29 May, 2000.
The United Kingdom and Ireland are not participating fully of cooperation
in Justice and Home Affairs, but can choose to participate29. Regarding this
Regulation they have chosen to be parties of it. Denmark, on the other hand, has
by the Edinburg decision chosen to be excluded from cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs30. Accordingly it follows from the preamble of the Regulation that
Denmark is not bound by nor subject to the application of the Regulation31.
However, Denmark has indicated that it wishes to apply the same rules as those
defined in the Regulation on the basis of an agreement to be concluded between it
and the Community32.
2.4 Differences between the Convention and
the Regulation
The substantive rules in the Regulation are in principle identical to those in the
Convention. However there are small differences, mainly due to the fact that the
judicial form of the legislation is changed. The Regulation is directly applicable
with a common date of entering into force in all Member States. Signing and
ratification are not needed, as they were for the Convention. The Regulation has
another judicial basis – Articles 61 and 67 EC – than the Convention, which was
founded on Article 220 EC Treaty (now 293 EC).
Furthermore Denmark was part of the Convention, but is not part of the
Regulation.
The Regulation has another relation to EC law, which is natural since it is
a supranational legal act, in contrast to a convention, having the character of an
intragovernmental legal act. According to the preamble of the Convention it was
stated that ”the High Contracting Parties to this Convention, Member States of
the European Union, […]  aware that this Convention does not affect the
application of the provisions of Community law which, in relation to particular
matters, lay down rules relating to insolvency proceedings or of national law
harmonized in implementation of such Community law”. The meaning of this was
                                                
27 Article 67 EC.
28 Commission´s Draft Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, submitted to the
Council on 26 May 1999, OJ  1999 C 221/8.
29 Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the
EU and the EC Treaties.
30 Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the posisiton of  Denmark annexed to the EU and the
EC Treaties. Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European
Council at Edinburgh on 12 December 1992, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark
on the Treaty on European Union.
31 Recital 33 of the preamble to the Regulation.
32 Council´s Press Release of 29 May 2000, 183.
8that Community law would have priority in an eventual conflict with the
Convention33. This statement has no correspondance in the Regulation, since the
legislation now is part of EC law.
What is also worth mentioning is that the conditions for preliminary rulings
are not exactly the same in this matter as in matters governed by Article 234 EC.
According to Article 68.1 EC only a ”court or tribunal of a Member State against
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law” is entitled to ask
for a preliminary ruling, whereas even other courts or tribunals may ask for a
preliminary ruling according to Article 234 EC. It is mandatory according to the
Regulation to ask for a preliminary ruling if it is necessary for a judgment, since
Article 68.1 EC says that the court or tribunal shall ask for a preliminary ruling.
This was voluntary according to the Convention, since Article 44 stated that the
courts listed in the Article may ask for a preliminary ruling. Additionaly, the
Council, the Commission or a Member State may ask for a ruling even if there is
no pending case before a court, according to Article 68.3 EC. This was however
also possible for a ”competent authority in a Contracting State” according to the
Convention, Article 45.
According to Article 44 of the Regulation it ”replaces”other Conventions
between Member States. The word ”supersede” was used instead in the
Convention, Article 48. In the Swedish text the words ”ha företräde” were used
in the Convention. They have been changed to ”ersätter” in the Regulation. I don´t
think there is a practical difference despite the different wording.
In the Swedish text of Article 3.1 of the Convention the word företag has
been changed to ”bolag”, probably to comply with the other language versions.
They are using the words ”company or legal person”, ”sociétés et les personnes
morales” and ”Gesellschaften und juristischen Personen”34. The wording in the
Swedish version of Article 4.2.m of the Convention and the Regulation has also
been amended from ”rättshandlingars nullitet, återgång eller ogiltighet” to
”återvinningsbestämmelser eller liknande bestämmelser”, which is the correct legal
term35. Concerning Sweden the Regulation is – due to domestic legislative
amendments – not  encompassing ”Offentligt ackord”, which was listed in Annex
A to the Convention.
There may be other differences which I have not found, but no substantial
amendments.
2.5 Comparison with other Conventions
The Regulation is a ”double” or ”direct” convention, containing both rules about
recognition/enforcement and jurisdiction. Additionaly it contains choice-of-law
                                                
33 Bogdan, Mikael, Sveriges och EU:s internationella insolvensrätt, Norstedts Juridik,
Stockholm, 1997, p 155.
34 The meaning of företag as encompassing private persons having an own business has
been pointed out by Bogdan,  p 164.
35 Mellqvist considered the formulation in the Convention as ”unfortunate”, Ny Juridik 4:96,
p 40.
9provisions. Brussels I is also double, but is does not contain conflict law rules, so
the Regulation goes a step further.
The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention36 is a ”simple” or ”indirect”
convention, which contains only recognition/enforcement rules and no direct rules
of jurisdiction, which means that jurisdiction is not limited by the convention and
can still be determined by each contracting state on its own37. The Nordic
Bankruptcy Convention additionaly contains choice-of-law provisions, with lex
concursus as a main rule38.
After the entry into force the Regulation will, regarding Sweden, replace
the Nordic Bankruptcy Convention in relation to Finland39. The Nordic
Bankruptcy Convention will still apply concerning Denmark, Iceland and Norway
and will also have priority if the Regulation is irreconcilable with it40.
The Istanbul Convention is also of the ”simple” or ”indirect” type, which
merely lays down rules of indirect international jurisdiction. It leaves the Parties
free to continue to apply their existing national rules of jurisdiction, even against
debtors resident or domiciled in another Party41.
                                                
36 The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention concluded at Copenhagen on 7 November 1933. The
original version of the Convention remains applicable in Iceland. Certain amendments – not
effecting main principles – have been made and entered into force between Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden, see Bogdan p 142-143.
37 Bogdan, p 144.
38 Bogdan, p 147.
39 Article 44 of the Regulation.
40 Article 44.3 of the Regulation.
41 Fletcher, 1999, p 304.
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3 The Explanatory Report
An Explanatory Report is written to the Convention. The Report is written in all
official EU-languages. Several Member States wanted the Report to be published
as an important source of law42, but this was never done. The reason why is not
clear. It might simply be due to the fact that the Convention never came into
force. But this can be argued against since there has been a publication of an
explanatory report to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters43, which convention was later
on, without coming into force, replaced by a regulation – Brussels II. In that case
the Explanatory Report was approved the same day as it was signed, which
makes a difference. The Explanatory Report of the Insolvency Convention was
completed at a late stage. The Report is dated 8 July, 1996 and the assignment
period of the Convention expired in May, 1996. To publish an explanatory report
when the assignment period has expired is illogical. Later on, when the Regulation
was adopted, the legal instrument was changed and regulations are not
traditionally acompanied by explanatory reports, which may explain why the
Explanatory Report was never published.
Instead of explanatory reports, regulations have preambles. In this case the
text of the preamble to the Insolvency Regulation is to a large extent drawn from
the Explanatory Report. Nevertheless the Explanatory Report has no official
status and it is an open question if this will prevent the ECJ from using it when
interpreting the Regulation. Mellqvist is of the opinion that the Report will be of
great importance as a secondary source of law when the Regulation will come
into force44. The Report has been produced collectively by the expert group
[called the ad hoc Committee in this work, see 2.2 The Convention] and the
group is unified concerning the content of the Report. Several states have made
their assignment of the Convention conditional by the fact that the Explanatory
Report should be given a certain content and be drawn up in a certain way45.
Mellqvist means that his opinion – that the Explanatory Report will be of great
importance as a source of law – is shared amongst many of the persons who have
worked with both the Convention and the Regulation. But he is aware that this
point of view might not be accepted “in a wider circle”46.
The new order, with regulations instead of conventions concerning private
international law, is critisized by Lueke, since the motives for the legislation will
not be as well documented as before. He means that commentary-like reports by
                                                
42 Mellqvist, Ny Juridik 4:96, p 18.
43 The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Matrimonial Matters, signed on 28 May 1998, OJ 1998 C 221/1. The Explanatory Report
published in OJ 1998 C 221/27.
44 Mellqvist, Mikael, “EU:s förordning om insolvensförfaranden – en följetong i europeisk
insolvensrätt – del 1”. Ny Juridik, 2000, nr 1, Ny Juridik 1:00, p 21.
45 Mellqvist, Ny Juridik 4:96, p 18.
46 Mellgvist, Ny Juridik 1:00, p 21-22.
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the drafters of the text have proven to be an important source for  interpretation,
as far as conventions are concerned47. He means that the ”whereas-clauses” in
preceding regulations are normally too succint to substitute for a report. However,
regarding this Regulation he finds it well documented, due to the fact that it mainly
contains the draft text of the Convention previously agreed upon48.
It has been difficult to find out if the Explanatory Report will be considered
a source of law, even if it is not formally accompanying the Regulation. None of
the other authors I have studied, has argued about the Report as a source of law
as thoroughly as Mellqvist. Bogdan seems to accept his line of thought, referring
to him, but notably calling the Explanatory Report ”an important tool of
interpretation”, not a source of law49. Some of the authors I have studied have
referred to the Report while commenting on the substance of the Regulation,
although they were commenting on the Regulation and not the Convention,
Lauterfeld and Lueke for example50.  This might be a sign that they share Mr
Mellqvist´s opinion, but that is only an assumption and I can not be sufficiently
sure to draw that conclusion.
Since it is a detailed report – Fletcher finds it more detailed and precise
than the reports accompanied by the Brussels Convention (now Brussels I) and
the Rome Convention51 - I find it very likely that it will be used in some way by
the ECJ, but maybe not by formal reference to it. It happens that the ECJ uses
preparatory documents, for example to confirm an interpretation that is already
reached by other arguments52 and when interpreting secondary legislation53.
International private law is an area where the preparatory work are often cited by
the ECJ54. The Explanatory Report is not published, which might weaken its
position as a source of law, since the level of transparency of the preparatory
                                                
47 Lueke, Wolfgang Dr, ”The New European Law on International Insolvencies: A German
perspective”. Bankruptcy Developments Journal, 2001, p 371, quoting the Jenard &
Schlosser Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters of 27 September 1968, OJ 1979 C 59/1, 71.
48 Lueke, p 371.
49 Bogdan, p 154-155.
50 Lauterfeld, Marc in ”Centros and the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: The End
of the ”Real Seat” Approach towards Pseudo-foreign Companies in German International
Company and Insolvency Law?”European Business Law Review, 2001, vol 12, no 3-4, p 79-
88. Lueke, Wolfgang Dr in ,”The New European Law on International Insolvencies: A
German perspective”. Bankruptcy Developments Journal, 2001, p 369-405.
51 Fletcher 1997, “The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An overview and
comment with US interest in Mind”. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 1997, vol 23, no
1, p 34, quoting P Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979, Martino de Almeida Cruz et al, Report on
the Convention, 1990 and Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980.
52 Bernitz, Ulf, Sverige och Europarätten, Norstedts Juridik, Stockholm, 2002, p 32
quoting Öberg, Ulf ”Några anteckningar om användningen av förarbeten inom
gemenskapsrätten”,  Juridisk Tidskrift vid Stockholms Universitet, 2000-01, p 492 ff.
53 Bernitz, p 32 quoting Rasmussen, Hjalte, ”EU-ret i kontekst”, 4 udg, 2001, p 167.
54 Öberg, supra note 50, p 497, giving these examples: case 201/82 Gerling, p 17, C-383/95
Rutten, p 20, C-295/95 Farrell, p 24, C-260/97 Unibank, p 20 and C-8/98 Dansommer A/S, p 27-
28.
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work is decisive in that respect55. However, the Explanatory Report is not secret
and can easily be ordered and delivered electronically at the Council´s, why the
level of transparency can not be held that low, despite that it was not published.
                                                
55 Öberg, p 493, quoting Plender, ”The Interpretation of Community Acts by Reference to
the Intentions of the Authors”, Yearbook of European Law, vol 2, 1982, p 94; Bredimas,
Methods of Interpretation of Community Law, 1978, p 58 ff.
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4 Overview of the Regulation
The Regulation is not a new ”European Insolvency Act”, substituting national law
in all Member States. It is basically legislation of private international law
character. Like conventions it will interplay with national law regarding, for
example, the estate, that will be governed by the law of the Member State where
the proceedings were opened. The purpose has not been to harmonise the whole
field of insolvency law, but the intention has been to let the principle of universality
come through with exceptions. Besides rules about jurisdiction (Article 3) the
Regulation contains provisions about applicable law (Articles 4-15) and
recognition/enforcement (Articles 16-26).
4.1 The Objective and Scope
The judicial basis for the Regulation is Articles 61.c (reference to Article
65) and 67.1 EC. By Article 65 EC it follows that measures in the field of judicial
cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications shall only be taken if
they are necessary for ”the proper functioning of the internal market”. The
purpose to obtain such a market is to be found in the preamble of the Regulation,
stating that the activities of undertakings having cross-border effects also
regarding insolvencies affect the proper functioning of the internal market56. The
objective of the Regulation is then to make cross-border insolvency proceedings
operate efficiently and effectively and to avoid ”forum shopping”57.
The Regulation applies to ”collective insolvency proceedings which entail
partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator”.
Regarding Sweden it is applicable to ”konkurs” and ”företagsrekonstruktion”58.
The scope can be amended on the initiative of a Member State or the
Commission, by the Council acting by qualified majority59.
The Regulation is applicable only if the centre of the debtor´s main interests
is located in the Community60. An exception is made concerning insurance
undertakings, credit institutions, investment undertakings which provide services
involving the holding of funds or securities for third parties and collective
investment undertakings61. They are excluded simply because  insolvency
concerning such undertakings is to be regulated separately62. There are no
                                                
56 Recital 3.
57 Recitals 2 and 4.
58 Article 1.1 and Annex A attached to the Regulation.
59 Article 45.
60 Recital 14.
61 Article 1.2 and recital 9.
62 Two directives are adopted in this field; Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of  4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit
institutions, OJ 2001 L 125/15, that shall be complied with on 5 Maj 2004 and  Directive
2001/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001 on the
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definitions of the excepted undertakings in the Regulation, nor explanations in the
preamble. The excepted undertakings are thus defined in the Explanatory Report
with reference to current directives at that time. ”Insurance undertaking” was
covered by Directives 73/239/EEC and 79/267/EEC, ”credit institution” by
Directive 77/789/EEC, ”investment undertaking” by Directive 92/22/EEC and
”collective investment undertaking” by Directive 85/611/EEC 63. If the centre of
the debtor´s main interests is not located in the Community the Regulation is not
applicable, since Article 3.1 and 3.2 - according to the Explanatory Report -
assume that the centre of main interests is in a Member State. If there is no
”Community-jurisdiction”international private law will apply. Even when the
centre of a debtor´s main interests is in a Member State the provisions of the
Regulation are restricted to relations with other Member States. Regarding non-
Member States each State has to define its appropriate conflict rules64.
Accordingly there is an important limit of the scope of the Regulation, not clearly
defined in the Regulation, but important to mention.
Another limit of interest is the one in relation to Brussels I. Actions directly
derived from insolvency and in close connection with insolvency proceedings are
excluded from Brussels I, according to case 133/78 Gourdain v Nadler65. To
avoid loopholes between the Regulation and Brussels I, these related actions have
been made subject to the Regulation. Related actions can concern further conduct
of the proceedings, judicial approval of compositions, adjustment or avoidance of
antecedent  transactions, imposition of civil liability upon directors and others held
responsible for mismanagement and formal closure66. Article 25 states that
judgments deriving directly from insolvency proceedings and which are closely
linked with them shall be recognised and enforced in the same way as judgments
concerning the opening of proceedings. According to the Explanatory Report
actions derived from insolvency proceedings are also subject to the rules of
                                                                                                                           
reorganisation and winding up of insurance undertakings, OJ 2001 L 110/28, that shall be
implemented before the 20 April 2003.
63 Explanatory Report, para 57-60;
First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of direct insurance other than life assurance.
First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of direct life assurance.
First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 the coordination of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of direct life assurance.
Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities
field.
Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws,
regulations, and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective
investment in transferable securities (UCITS).
64 Explanatory Report, para 44 and 82.
65 Case 133/78 Henri Gourdain v Franz Nadler, [1979] E C R 733.
66 Fletcher, 1999, p 288.
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jurisdiction in the Regulation67. I don´t think the wording of Article 25 supports
that intention, since that Article only regulates recognition and enforceability. I find
no other support for that view in the Regulation either. Bogdan means that such an
extensive interpretation of the jurisdiction provisions in Article 3 has no support in
its wording and that it is doubtful if it is necessary, since it would not be
unreasonable to invoke that jurisdiction concerning such issues simply could be
regulated by each Member State´s national law68. Schollmeyer is of the opinion
that the problem of jurisdiction for related civil proceedings has not been resolved
by the Regulation and that the drafters of it therefore failed with one important
goal –to fully complement Brussels I69.
4.2 Cross-border Implications/Effects
The Regulation is concluded to regulate insolvency proceedings having cross-
border implications, which is the term used in Article 65 EC. In the preamble of
the Regulation it follows indirectly that the Regulation is applicable to insolvency
proceedings having cross-border effects70.  The terms differ and may have a
slightly different meaning. The condition for applicability of the Regulation – cross-
border implications or effects - is not explicitly mentioned in the legal text. I find
this unfortunate, since such an important condition should be clearly stated, to
avoid uncertainty. Since the legal instrument is a regulation, directly applicable in
the Member States and directly forms part of national law, its wording should
exclude applicability to domestic insolvencies. This cross-border condition is in
my opinion  clearer in Brussels I and Brussels II, because it follows more or less
automatically since it is a party-to-party situation. In the Rome Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contracts it is clearly stated that it applies to ”contractual
obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different
countries”71.
In an insolvency situation the cross-border implications concern of course
to a great extent assets situated in different Member States, which would
probably be the first thing to think about when examining the condition. In the
Nordic Bankruptcy Convention ”assets” is chosen as a cross-border condition. It
follows from Article 2 of the Nordic Bankruptcy Convention, which says that the
Convention is applicable if an insolvency in a Contracting State encompasses
assets in another Contracting State.
Dahan refers to cross-border insolvencies as insolvency proceedings which
                                                
67 Explanatory Report, para 77.
68 Bogdan, p 167.
69 Schollmeyer, Eberhard, “The New European Convention on International Insolvency”.
Bankruptcy Developments Journal, 1997, vol 13, no 2, p 434 and 441.
70 Recitals 3 and 8.
71 The Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in
Rome on 19 June 1980, OJ 1998 C 27/36, article 1.
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relate to more than one Member State and means that this may be because of the
debtor´s commercial activities in the jurisdiction concerned or the location of
assets, the debtor´s residence, contracts with third parties, etc72.
Fletcher describes it as follows: ”The debtor may own or have interests in
property not all of which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of a single state.
Liabilities may be owed to parties whose forensic connections are predominantly
with a different country to that with which the debtor is associated; or the relevant
obligations may be governed by foreign law, may have been incurred outside the
debtor´s home country or may be due to be performed abroad”73.
Cross-border insolvencies seem to encompass a great deal and if the
question arises before the ECJ in a preliminary ruling I assume that the
interpretation  has to be made broadly.
It is not unlikely that cross-border implications can appear after the
opening of a domestic insolvency proceeding. It does not follow from the
Regulation how such an insolvency should be handled. Recognition of a judgment
opening insolvency proceedings seems to depend on the use of the jurisdiction
provisions in the Regulation74. Since these provisions probably are not identical to
domestic rules in any Member State this can cause problems, especially if the
insolvency proceeding should have been considered as a main proceeding
according to the Regulation. I assume that a domestic judgment will be
considered as falling outside the scope of the Regulation and not be recognised by
it, which might give rise to future amendments of the Regulation.
4.3 Main and Territorial/Secondary Proceedings
This Regulation contains a compromise between the principle of
universality and the principle of territoriality. According to the preamble a main
proceeding aims at encompassing all assets in the Member States75 and is
automatically recognised in all the other Member States from the time that it
becomes effective in the State of the opening of proceedings76. Recognition  no
longer depends on each state´s own private international law. The effect of
recognition is thus only partial, since secondary proceedings still can be opened in
another Member State, despite the opening of a main proceeding77. This can be
made under special conditions – if a debtor possesses an establishment within the
territory in another Member State than where the centre of the debtor´s main
interests is situated. Such a proceeding is secondary and is restricted to the assets
in the territory where the establishment is situated78. Under special conditions it is
                                                
72 Dahan, Frédérique, ”The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings – Good News
for Lawyers?”. Developments in European Comapny Law 1996, vol 1, p 216.
73 Fletcher, 1999, p 5.
74 Articles 16-17.
75 Recital 12.
76 Article 16.1.
77 Articles 16.2 and 17.1.
78 Articles 3.2 and 16.2.
17
also possible to open territorial proceedings without a main proceeding being
opened79. The solution with secondary proceedings is an option for a creditor to
”protect” local assets. However the creditor can choose to lodge his claim in the
main insolvency proceedings instead80. That option may of course be less
attractive, because of different legal systems with different rules about priority of
claims, language problems and so on. The liquidators in the different proceedings
are thus obliged to cooperate and communicate with each other; for example the
liquidator in the main proceeding shall be given the opportunity to submit
proposals on the liquidation of assets in the secondary proceeding81. Secondary
proceedings are also subject to main proceedings by the fact that assets remaining
in a secondary proceeding after termination shall immediately be transferred to the
main proceeding82. The compromise between the principles of universality and
territoriality has been criticized. Leuke is of the opinion that it renders
considerably more complex and costly the handling of transnational insolvencies,
but he is aware that this was the only feasible approach83.
4.4 Lex Concursus
As a main rule, the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their
effects is that of the ”State of the opening of proceedings” – lex concursus84.
There are different exceptions to that rule, which concern inter alia right in rem,
set-off, immovable property and contracts of employment. The choice-of-law
rules have been commented on by different authors. Fletcher considers that they
provide a practical and realistic solution to many troublesome questions which
arise in a cross-border insolvency85. Dahan reflects over ”the urgent need for
harmonisation of concepts and a common understanding of where each Member
State stands with regard to insolvency policy”86. Segal finds that the operation of
the choice-of-law rules, by virtue of the various exceptions to, and carve-outs
from, the general rule providing for the application of the law of the state of the
opening of proceedings, combined with the practicalities of conducting business
across the Community, means that the Community-wide effect of even a main
proceeding will be limited87. Schollmeyer thinks that choice-of-law rules rather
than allocation of jurisdiction is a modern solution and that it furthers integration
                                                
79 Article 3.4.
80 Article 39.
81 Article 31.
82 Article 35.
83 Lueke, p 405.
84 Article 4.
85 Fletcher, Ian F, “The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-Of-
Law Provisions”. Texas international law journal, 1998, vol 33, no 1, p 139.
86 Dahan, p 230.
87 Segal, Nick, “The choice of Law Provisions in the European Union Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings”. Brooklyn journal of international law, 1997, vol 23, no 1, p 73.
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by adopting a federal model which affects the fifteen substantive bankruptcy laws
as little as possible88.
                                                
88 Schollmeyer, p 441.
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5 The Centre of Main Interests
The conditions in Article 3.1 of the Regulation for jurisdiction regarding a main
proceeding contain a rebuttable presumption:
The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor´s
main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. In
the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office shall be
presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
French version:
Les juridictions de l’État membre sur le territoire duquel est situé le centre des
intérêts principaux du débiteur sont compétentes pour ouvrir la procédure
d’insolvabilité. Pour les sociétés et les personnes morales, le centre des intérêts
principaux est présumé, jusqu’à preuve contraire, être le lieu du siège statutaire.
German version:
Für die Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens sind die Gerichte des Mitgliedstaats
zuständig, in dessen Gebiet der Schuldner den Mittelpunkt seiner hauptsächlichen
Interessen hat. Bei Gesellschaften und juristischen Personen wird bis zum Beweis
des Gegenteils vermutet, daß der Mittelpunkt ihrer hauptsächlichen Interessen der
Ort des satzungsmäßigen Sitzes ist.
Swedish version:
Domstolarna i den medlemsstat inom vars territorium platsen där gäldenärens
huvudsakliga intressen finns, har behörighet att inleda ett insolvensförfarande. För
bolag och andra juridiska personer skall sätet anses vara platsen där de huvudsakliga
intressena finns, om inte annat visas.
In the Istanbul Convention the same expression and presumption as in the
Regulation are used (Article 4.1). In the UNCITRAL Model Law a foreign main
proceeding is defined as ”a foreign proceeding taking place in the State where the
debtor has the centre of its main interests” (Article 2.6).
The 1980 Draft Convention used ”the centre of administration” (centre des
affairs) instead of the final concept. There was a definition of the concept meaning
”the place where the debtor usually administers his main interests”. There was
also a rebuttable presumption – “in case of firms, companies and legal persons –
that the registered office is the place where the debtor´s main interests are usually
administered”.
5.1 Incorporation/Real Seat
The new concept ”centre of main interests” is not known in EC law. Omar
considers it an attempt to compromise between the state of incorporation
doctrine used by Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, United
Kingdom and the real seat doctrine, used by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany
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and Luxembourg89. The doctrines contain two contrasting conflict of law theories
regarding the recognition of foreign legal persons. According to the incorporation
theory, a company is governed by the law according to which it is (duly)
established, whereas the latter [real seat] theory prescribes that the law of the
country where the company has its real seat (i e its management and control
centre) is applicable to company relationships. Thus, the incorporation theory
stands for party autonomy while the real seat theory stands for an objective
proper law test90. Rammeloo adds Italy, as a country using the real seat theory, to
the enumeration above91.
Since the enumeration does not encompass all EU Member States, it may be that
the real seat theory – with slight modifications – is the rule in the majority of
Member States, which has been said by Lauterfeld92.
Usually, ”the place of the registered office” is also ”the place where the
company or legal person is incorporated”, but this is not compulsory under each
system of law adhering to the incorporation theory93. According to the
Explanatory Report (paragraph 75) the registered office was held to normally
correspond to the debtor´s head office.
In German Company Law – also applicable to German Insolvency Law –
the  real seat theory is established by case law94. It uses the company´s principal
place of business as an objective connecting factor95. The real seat theory
”German-style”, the Sitztheorie, has been defined by the Bundesgerichtshof as
”the locus where the internal management decisions are transformed into the day
to day business activities of a company”96. The German case law has further
established that ”the seat of a company is assumed, where the company is
registered”97.
In French Insolvency Law jurisdiction is determined by where the debtor
has its seat or, in default of a seat in France, where its principal business
                                                
89 Omar, Paul J, “Centros revisited; Assessing the impact on corporate organisation in
Europe”. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 2000, p 407-408.
90 Rammeloo, Stephan, Corporations in Private International Law. A European
perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p 87.
91 Rammeloo comments on these countries and Switzerland through the book.
92 Lauterfeld, p 79, quoting Grossfeld, Bernard, in: Julius von Staudinger (ed), Kommentar
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Internationales Gesell-shaffsrecht, Berlin 1998, para 152 et
seq.
93 Rammeloo, p 16.
94 Lauterfeld, p 79, quoting RGZ 77, 19 (22); RGZ 159, 33 (46); BGHZ 51, 27 (28); BGHZ 97,
269 (271 et seq); BayObLG (1993) Eu ZW 548 and p 81.
95 Lauterfeld, p 79, quoting Kropholler, Jan, Internationales Privatrecht, 2nd edition,
Tügingen 1994, at page 471; Ebke, Werner F, ”Centros – Some Realities and Some
Mysteries”, hand out at the ”Symposium on the Centros Decision of the European Court of
Justice and its consequences”, King´s College London, 28-29 April 2000, at page 2 et seq.
96 Lauterfeld, p 79, quoting BGHZ 97, 269 (272); also BayOBLG, (1986) IPRax 161, 163.
97 Lauterfeld, p 79, quoting OLG München (1986) NJW 2197; Kropholler, supra note 95, at
page 473.
21
interests are located98. A French court will examine whether the location of the
seat corresponds to the reality of business activity. Where the seat located
overseas is deemed a fiction because in reality the board of directors operates in
France, this fact would give jurisdiction99. Also, French Insolvency Law goes
beyond the real seat doctrine and states that French courts are competent to
conduct insolvency proceedings, even in the absence of a seat in France and
notwithstanding that the foreign seat may be real, where the company´s centre of
business interests is deemed to be located within the jurisdiction100.
The effects of the real seat doctrine are complex and differ between states
that acknowledge its use, depending often on the precise context in which it is
sought to apply the principle101.
The ECJ has never really expressed a preference for either doctrine under
European Union Law102. In the Daily Mail judgment the ECJ stated that ”In
defining, in Article 58 [now 48], the companies which enjoy the right of
establishment, the Treaty places on the same footing, as connecting factors, the
registered office, central administration and principal place of business of a
company”103. However, Omar has interpreted the Centros judgment104 as ”an
implicit preference for the state of incorporation doctrine”105. Rammeloo is also of
the opinion that neither of the theories has been imposed upon EC member states
by Articles 43 and 48 [EC] and that European law as it now stands still permits
EC member states to adhere to the real seat theory106.
5.2 Relating Concepts
The closest concept to compare to is, in my opinion, the concept for jurisdiction
in Brussels I, since the regulations are located in the same context and with
somewhat common motives – inter alia to avoid ”forum shopping”. Brussels II is
not about companies and the Rome Convention is not about jurisdiciton. I will
therefore leave these legislative acts of private international law without
comparison. The concept for jurisdiction in Brussels I concerning the main rule is
domicile. To determine whether a party is domiciled in a Member State reference
is made in Article 59 to internal law. This provision is identical to the
                                                
98 Omar, Paul J, “Jurisdiction in the European Insolvency Convention: A practical problem”.
International company and commercial law review, 1999, vol 10, no 7, 1999, p 225, quoting
Decree No 85-1388 of December 27, 1985, Art 1.
99 Omar, 2000, p 408, quoting Cour d´Appel de Paris, July 9, 1960, Juris-Classeur Commercial
fasc 3130, para 31.
100 Omar, 2000, p 408, quoting Art 1 of Decree No 85-1388 of December 27, 1985 and
Cassation civile, July 21, 1987, D 1988, p 169.
101 Omar, 2000, p 408.
102 Omar, 2000, p 408.
103 Case 81/87, The Queen v H M Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte
Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, [1988] E C R 5483, paragraph 21.
104 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] E C R I-1459.
105 Omar, 2000, p 408.
106 Rammeloo, p 317-318.
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corresponding Article 52 of the Brussels Convention. When it comes to legal
persons the rules concerning determination of domicile have changed. According
to Article 60 of Brussels I a company or other legal person or association of
natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its statutory seat, or
central administration, or principal place of business. It is almost identical to the
concept in Article 48 EC, ”the right of establishment”. Appearently there are three
alternatives and domicile will be determined within this provision, since reference
is not made to private international law. This is a change compared to the Brussels
Convention, Article 53 where the seat of the legal person should be treated as its
domicile and in order to determine that seat reference was made to private
international law. Additionaly, in Article 60 of Brussels I there is an explanation
for the purposes of the United Kingdom and Ireland of ”statutory seat”. This
means the registered office or, where there is no such office anywhere, the place
of incorporation or, where there is no such  place anywhere, the place under the
law of which the formation took place.
Other concepts of interest can be found in European Company Law. In the
Regulation on the Statute for a European Company one of the conditions for
applicability is that the companies have registered offices and head offices within
the Community. If a company with its registered office in a Member State has its
head office outside the Community the Regulation can apply if the company has a
real and continuous link with a Member State´s economy107.  I suppose this is the
”real seat arrangement” that is mentioned in recital 27 of that Regulation. In the
closely related area – European Tax Law – the key is “residence”108.
5.3  No Definition
In contrast to the 1980 Draft Convention the Regulation contains no
definition of ”the debtor´s centre of main interests”. It was suggested during the
preparatory work to the Regulation to define the concept. The Committee on
Citizen´s Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs thought that there
should be an incorporated definition to achieve maximum legal clarity109. This was
however not passed forward by the Parliament110. The preamble of the
Regulation will under these circumstances, one would assume, be of great
importance regarding interpretation of the concept. Recitals 13 of the preamble
reads as follows:
                                                
107 Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the statute for a
European Company, OJ 2001 L 294/1. It will come into force 3 years after adoption, which is
on 8 Oct 2004.
108 See for example Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member
States, OJ 1990 L 225/6.
109 Report of the Committee´s on Citizens´Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs
opinion on 28 January 2000, document A5-0039/2000, page 14, see
http://europa.eu.int/prelex/apcnet.cfm.
110 Parliament´s opinion on 2 March 2000, OJ 2000 C 346/80.
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The ”centre of main interests” should correspond to the place where the
debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is
therefore ascertainable by third parties.
French version:
Le centre des intérêts principaux devrait correspondre au lieu où le débiteur
gère habituellement ses intérêts et qui est donc vérifiable par les tiers.
German version:
Als Mittelpunkt der hauptsächlichen Interessen sollte der Ort gelten, An dem der
Schuldner gewöhnlich der Verwaltung seinger Interessen nachgeht und damit für
Dritte feststellbar ist.
Swedish version:
Begreppet platsen där de huvudsakliga intressena finns bör motsvara den plats där
gäldenären vanligtvis förvaltar sina intressen och därför är fastställbar för tredje
man.
However, this is a very broad explanation, leaving a choice whether to follow it,
since the word ”should” is used. The explanation is not a definition and is not
exhaustive. You could consider it as an example of the concept. The intent seems
to be that the debtor shall be active in the place, but – most important – visible for
third parties at that place. Lauterfeld is of the opinion that ”transparency and
objective ascertainability” are to be given special emphasis in interpreting
”COMI” [centre of main interests] as connecting factor111. Furthermore
Lauterfeld thinks that it should not be permissible for a corporate debtor to take
advantage of some secret conduct, or of a ”rootless” arrangement for conducting
the control and management of operations, such that outsiders cannot identify any
locus at which these functions are discharged on a regular or “day-to-day”
basis112.
The Commission had, during the preparatory work to the Regulation,
another explanation of the concept, which is more like a definition. The preamble
to the proposed Regulation reads as follows (recital 13):
The centre of main interests is taken as meaning a place with which a debtor regularly
has very close contacts, in which his manifold commercial interest are concentrated
and in which the bulk of his assets is for the most part situated. The creditor is also
very familiar with that place.
Finally, the line of thought behind the concept is also developed in the Explanatory
Report. Paragraph 75 reads as follows:
The concept of ”centre of  main interests” must be interpreted as the
place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a
regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.
                                                
111 Lauterfeld, p 83, citing Fletcher, Ian I in ”International Insolvency at the Crossroads. A
Critical Approach of Current Trends”, hand out at the Schmitthoff  Symposium on Finance
of International Trade – Law and Trade in the 21 st Century, Centre of Commercial Law
Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1-3 June 2000, at page 4.
112 Lauterfeld, p 83, quoting Fletcher, supra  note 108, at page 4.
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Swedish version:
Begreppet ”huvudsakliga intressen” skall tolkas som den plats där
gäldenären vanligtvis förvaltar sina intressen och där detta går att uppfatta
även av tredje man.
In my opinion there is a difference between the two versions of the Explanatory
Report. In the Swedish version there seems to be a condition that the place shall
be ascertainable by third parties, whereas this is held as an effect in the English
version. There is a difference between ”must” and ”shall” – but maybe without
significance in practice. It seems as if the differences can be explained by
translation errors. Still, this explanation of the concept is much firmer – like the
definition proposed by the Commission – compared to the one stated in the final
preamble to the Regulation. In the Regulation the firmer position has been
abandoned and the scope of interpretation has in my opinion become wider. It
seems as if the concept in the Regulation has intentionally been left very open,
perhaps in order for the ECJ to be rather free in interpreting it.
Furthermore it follows from the Explanatory Report (paragraph 75) that it
is considered important that the place is known to the debtor´s potential creditors,
in order for them to calculate the legal risks in the case of insolvency. By using the
term ”interests”, the intention was to encompass not only commercial, industral or
professional activities, but also general economic activities, so as to include the
activities of private individuals (e.g. consumers). The expression ”main” serves as
a criterion for the cases where these interests include activities of different types
which are run from different centres. In principle, the centre of main interests will
in the case of professionals be the place of their professional domicile and for
natural persons in general, the place of their habitual residence. These
explanations have not been taken up in the Regulation. They show the original
intent of the authors and might be of interest from that aspect when interpreting
the concept.
Because of the absence of a definition of “centre of main interests” there is
a potential for conflict if two jurisdictions purport to open main proceedings
independently in time [a positive jurisdictional conflict]113. There is also a
possibility that no court will consider itself competent to open proceedings
[negative jurisdictional conflict]. There is no provision in the Regulation dealing
with such conflicts, which have been pointed out by some authors114. The
problem about positive jurisdictional conflicts has now been taken care of by
recital 22 of the Regulation, stating that “The decision of the first court to open
proceedings should be recognised in the other Member States without those
Member States having the power to scrutinise the court´s decision”.
                                                
113 Omar, 1999, p 225.
114 Fletcher, 1999, p 261 and Lueke, p 381. Omar, 1999, p 255 and Bogdan, p 163 about
positive jurisdicitional conflicts.
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5.4 Interpretation by the ECJ
It is of course very difficult to know how the ECJ will interprete this new concept.
The intent of the authors to the Regulation regarding interpretation can be found in
the Expanatory Report (paragraph 43), which reads as follows:
“In the same way as in the 1968 Brussels Convention and the 1980 Rome
Convention, two principles should be followed when interpreting its [the
Convention´s] provisions: the principle of respect for the international character of
the rule, and the principle of uniformity. The Convention is a self-contained legal
structure, and its concepts cannot be placed in the same category as concepts
belonging to national law.  The Convention must retain the same meaning within
different national systems.  Its concepts may not therefore be interpreted simply as
referring to the national law of one or other of the States concerned. When the
substance of a problem is directly governed by the Convention, the international
character of the Convention requires an autonomous interpretation of its concepts.
An autonomous interpretation implies that the meaning of its concepts should be
determined by reference to the objectives and system of the Convention, taking into
account the specific function of those concepts within this system and the general
principles which can be inferred from all the national laws of the Contracting States”.
Two examples of concepts which are meant to be found in national law are
mentioned in the Explanatory Report (paragraph 43) – “insolvency” in Article 1 of
the Regulation and “rights in rem” in Article 5 of the Regulation.
Regarding the Brussels Convention (now Brussels I) the ECJ has stated:
“As far as possible, the Court of Justice gives the terms used in the Brussels
Convention an autonomous interpretation, rather than by reference to national
law, so as to ensure that the Convention is fully effective, having regard to the
objectives of Article 220 of the EC Treaty (now Article 293 EC), in the
implementation of which the Convention was adopted […]115.
The ECJ has however also pointed out that neither option of interpretation
excludes the other, since the appropriate choice can be made only in relation to
each of the provisions of the Brussels Convention (now Brussels I)116. As an
example of reference to national law, “place of performance” in Article 5.1 of
Brussels I has been determined by rules of conflict of laws117 and when an “action
is brought” within the meaning of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (now
Article 27 of  Brussels I) according to national law118. The explanation of the
choice of interpretation has been the lack of unification of substantive laws119and
that there was no attempt to unify the particular rule120.
Lauterfeld means that “COMI” is formally an autonomous concept, but
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that the scope for interpretation of it is limited. He suggests that only the criteria
given by the Bundesgerichshof match the requirements of “COMI” in all respects,
since the “day-to-day business activity” is the basis for the creditor´s assessment
of the company and not the management decision itself121.
Omar argues on his behalf, that it is not inconceivable that the ECJ will
have regard to French usage in formulating the definition of “centre of main
interests”, since the term is used in French law122.
Dahan means generally that the concepts of the Regulation must be
understood uniformly and cannot simply be interpreted in accordance with
existing domestic ones123.
Fletcher is of the opinion that a uniform interpretation should be promoted
by the fact that the same expressions [“centre of main interests” and
“establishment”] were about to be included in the UNCITRAL Model Law [and
were later included, as will be seen in chapter 6 of this work], which is an
international instrument sharing a common purpose124. He argues that the key
concepts may be seen as forming part of the global movement to develop a
standardised framework for processing cross-border insolvency issues and that it
is desirable for a coherent synthesis to be attempted at the earliest possible date
to avoid multiple sets of incompatible rules125.
In my opinion it is very likely that the ECJ will use this method to look at
the objective and the location for the rule ”in the general scheme” and will then
find it necessary to apply a uniform interpretation in order to make the Regulation
effective. If  the concept was not given a uniform meaning, different interpretations
could be made in different states, perhaps ending up with concurring fora. With
such an order the objective to unify rules of jurisdiction and avoid forum shopping
would not be fulfilled. A uniform interpretation is also supported by the fact that
this has as far as possible been the aim of the ECJ before, regarding Brussels I. It
is clear from the Explanatory Report and the preamble of the Regulation that the
intent has been to unify jurisdiction rules in this field, where reference to national
law would be in opposition to this intent, With that in mind, I find no good reason
for the ECJ to refer to national law regarding this concept. But it is possible that
the ECJ will be inspired by national law when determining how the autonomous
concept will be interpreted. This view is supported by the fact that the Court of
First Instance has held that reference to the law of the Member States may be
done in order to interprete a provision that shall be given an independent and
uniform interpretation, which might be necessary if the criteria for defining the
meaning of the provision cannot be identified in Community law126.
The definition in German case law of the real seat theory and its
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resemblance with “centre of main interests” is difficult to deny, but there may be
other definitions in other Member States also very close to the new concept.
Anyway, with all the compromises made within the work of this Regulation it is
difficult to believe that the ECJ would choose to refer to one theory in one
Member State. In my opinion, the German definition will maybe influence the
ECJ, but will not be totally decisive for the interpretation.
Since the preamble describes the concept and is more or less giving an
example of it, I think it may be useful, but the ECJ will still have a very broad
scope of interpretation. The ECJ has referred to the preamble in the beginning of
interpretation of the Brussels Convention (now Brussels I)127 and since this is a
very natural thing to do I believe this will also be done concerning this concept,
but it can not be decisive for interpretation either.
Maybe the Explanatory Report will be looked at in general, but since it
differs slightly from the preamble regarding this concept I do not think reference
will be made to it by the ECJ. The parts describing “main” and “interests” are not
mentioned in the preamble and they are therefore more likely to be used in
interpretation. The ECJ is however not bound by travaux préparatoires
(preparatory work) and since enough guidance probably can be found in national
law I find it unlikely that the Explanatory Report will play a major role in
interpretation of this concept.
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6 Establishment
The conditions in Article 3.2 of the Regulation for territorial jurisdiction read as
follows:
Where the centre of a debtor´s main interests is situated within the territory of a
Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiciton to open
insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he possesses an establishment
within the territory of that other Member State. The effects of those proceedings
shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in the territory of the latter
Member State.
There is a definition of ”establishment” in Article 2.h of the Regulation:
”establishment” shall mean any place of operations where the debtor carries out a
non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods.
French version:
"établissement": tout lieu d'opérations où le débiteur exerce de façon non transitoire
une activité économique avec des moyens humains et des biens.
German version:
"Niederlassung" jeden Tätigkeitsort, an dem der Schuldner einer wirtschaftlichen
Aktivität von nicht vorübergehender Art nachgeht, die den Einsatz von Personal und
Vermögenswerten voraussetzt.
Swedish version:
driftställe: varje verksamhetsplats där gäldenären annat än tillfälligt idkar ekonomisk
verksamhet med personella och materiella resurser.
In the Istanbul Convention ”establishment” is used as an alternative condition for
jurisdiction, but is not defined (Article 4.2). In the UNCITRAL Model Law
(Article 2.f) the same definition as in the Regulation is used, with the complement
of ”or services” directly after ”goods”.
The 1980 Draft Convention contained no definition, only the following
pronouncement: ”An establishment exists in a place where an activity of the
debtor comprising a series of transactions is carried on by him or on his
behalf”128.
Article 3.2 of the Regulation was one of the most debated provisions
throughout the negotiations of the Convention. Several Member States wished to
have the possibility of basing territorial proceedings not only on the presence of an
establishment, but also on the mere presence of assets of the debtor (assigned to
an economic activity) without the debtor having an establishment129. Finally they
agreed to change their views provided that ”establishment” would be interpreted
in a broad manner. That is why the definition is made very open130. The definition
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was made to avoid the narrow interpretation of “establishment” as has been
settled by the ECJ regarding Article 5 of Brussels I131.
Accordingly, the mere presence of assets does not enable local creditors to
open territorial proceedings. The presence of an establishment of the debtor
within the jurisdiction is necessary. “Place of operations”, according to the
Explanatory Report (paragraph 71), means a place from which economic
activities are exercised on the market (i.e. externally), whether the said activities
are commercial, industrial or  professional. The emphasis on an economic activity
having to be carried out using human resources shows the need for a minimum
level of organization. A purely occasional place of operations cannot be classified
as an "establishment". A certain stability is required. The negative formula ("non-
transitory") aims to avoid minimum time requirements. The decisive factor is how
the activity appears externally, and not the intention of the debtor. The rationale
behind the rule is that foreign economic operators conducting their economic
activities through a local establishment should be subject to the same rules as
national economic operators, as long as they are both operating in the same
market. In this way, potential creditors concluding a contract with a local
establishment will not have to worry about whether the company is a national or
foreign one. Their information costs and legal risks in the event of insolvency of
the debtor will be the same whether they conclude a contract with a national
undertaking or a foreign undertaking with a local presence on that market.
Naturally, the possibility of opening local territorial insolvency proceedings makes
sense only if the debtor possesses sufficient assets within the jurisdiction.
Whether or not these assets are linked to the economic activities of the
establishment is of no relevance132.
The concept of establishment within the meaning of the right of
establishment, Articles 43 and 48 EC, has by the ECJ been considered as fulfilled
regarding an insurance undertaking, maintaining a permanent presence in another
Member State consisting merely of an office managed by the undertaking´s own
staff or by a person who is independent but authorized to act on a permanent
basis for the undertaking, as would be the case of an agency133. That definition is
made in relation to the concept of freedom of services within the EC Treaty. The
ECJ has described the concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty
as “a very broad one, allowing a Community national to participate, on a stable
and continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State
of origin”134.
Regarding “establishment” within Article 5.5 of Brussels I the ECJ has held
that the exceptions to the general rule of jurisdiction in Article 2 of Brussels I must
not be given a wide interpretation135. The concept has been defined as “a place of
                                                
131 The Explanatory Report, para 70.
132 The Explanatory Report, para 71.
133 Case 205/84 Commission v Germany, [1986] E C R 3755,  paragraph 21.
134 Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell´Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano,
[1995] E C R I-4195, paragraph 25.
135 Case 33/78 Somafer v Saar-Ferngas, [1978] E C R 2183, paragraph 7.
30
business which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a
parent body, has a management and is materially equipped to negotiate business
with third parties so that the latter, although knowing that there will if necessary be
a legal link with the parent body, the head office of which is abroad, do not have
to deal directly with such parent body but may transact business at the place of
business constituting the extension”136.
All the concepts have some kind of permanency in common (stable and
continuous basis, permanent presence, non-transitory and appearance of
permanency). Within the Treaty concept it would be enough with one person
authorized to act permanently for the parent body in an office, which is not
enough within the Brussels I concept. Within that concept there are conditions of
organization and a visible link to the parent body. The Regulation concept is to my
opinion closer to the Brussels I concept than to the Treaty concept, regarding the
intent of the authors. But the definition in the Regulation is very wide and opens up
for a broader interpretation. The Regulation concept is used within an exception
to a main rule, just like the Brussels I concept. It is therefore possible that the ECJ
will interprete it rather similarly to the Brussels I concept, despite the intent of the
authors.
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